The developed
countries announced that Doha marked the start of fresh negotiations
that would embrace rules for investment, for government procurement,
for competition policy and for trade facilitation. In WTO parlance
these are the “Singapore issues”. The negotiations would
be the “Doha Development Round”, which would supposedly
address the needs of the developing countries.
In this interpretation, the only thing left to be decided was the
modalities of the negotiations.
But many developing countries had a different interpretation. They
pointed to a statement from the Doha Conference Chairman that negotiations
would only commence on the Singapore issues on the basis of an “explicit
consensus” at the 5th Ministerial.
The statement was issued on the insistence of a group of Asian, African
and Caribbean countries which felt that they were being railroaded
into supporting a Conference Declaration that did not reflect their
true position.
They were sending a message to the industrialized countries. Failure
to heed that message was at the root of the breakdown of the 5th Ministerial
at Cancun last week.
One aspect of the message related to procedure. From the time of the
disastrous 3rd Ministerial in Seattle in 1999 , developing countries
had been protesting at the non-transparency of WTO decision-making
processes. In effect, agreements were reached among major players
in so-called “Green Room” meetings and then presented
to the 140-plus membership for rubber-stamping.
One senior Caribbean negotiator recounted to me how he was physically
removed from a “Green Room” meeting in Doha, because he
was known as an articulate spokesman for the position of the African,
Caribbean and Pacific group of countries.
Developing countries were now signaling that all WTO members would
need to explicitly indicate their agreement to a decision on new negotiations.
Failing this, the decision would lack validity.
There were also substantive reasons for caution in starting negotiations
on the Singapore issues. For one thing, preparations will be expensive
and time-consuming for the issues are technically complex and cover
a wide range. The least developed and the smaller developing countries,
in particular, feel highly disadvantaged in such a process.
For another, agreeing to rules on investment, government procurement
and competition will bring the WTO deeply into areas of domestic policy
that impinge on national sovereignty and on the right to choose development
policies in accordance with national priorities.
And third, there is deep dissatisfaction with the lack of implementation
of commitments made under previous agreements. A major bone of contention
is massive agricultural subsidies in the rich countries that depress
the prices of products exported by poor countries, further impoverishing
their farmers.
Failure to make effective provision for Special and Differential Treatment
(SDT) of developing countries is another sore point. The Association
of Caribbean States has been working on the technical features of
an SDT regime for small economies, that will be further refined at
a seminar in Caracas later this month.
Cancun failed to achieve “explicit consensus” on negotiations
on the new issues because these concerns were not adequately addressed.
What was new was the unity and determination of the developing countries,
including the largest (China, India, Brazil,) represented by the newly
formed Group of 21.
Cancun showed that such unity among the countries of the South can
affect the outcome of global negotiations. This applies to other negotiating
arenas, such as finance and the environment. And it is an object lesson
on the need for unity for us in the Greater Caribbean.
